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 n October 5, 2013, United States forces captured and detained Abu 
Anas Al-Libi in Tripoli, Libya.  Al-Libi was, at one time, a senior member 
of Al-Qaeda with close links to Osama Bin Laden and, according to U.S. 
Secretary of State John Kerry, was a “legal and appropriate target.”1  Fol-
lowing his capture, Al-Libi was delivered to a U.S. warship, the USS San 
Antonio (LPD 17), and reportedly interrogated.2  He was transferred to the 
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U.S. within eight days of his capture. On October 14, 2013, Al-Libi entered 
not-guilty pleas to charges stemming from the 1998 Al Qaeda bombing 
campaign against U.S. embassies in East Africa.3 
This article addresses three issues concerning Al-Libi’s capture and de-
tention.  Part II examines the bases on which the U.S. might lawfully have 
crossed the Libyan border to conduct the operation, since incursion by one 
State into another can amount to a breach of international law.4  Part III 
assesses the grounds, under international law, on which the U.S. might law-
fully have captured Al-Libi.  Part IV addresses the circumstances of Al-
Libi’s subsequent detention. In conclusion, Part V lists several principles 
that can inform similar operations in the future. 
 
II. CROSSING THE LIBYAN BORDER 
 
An incursion into another State’s territory violates the use of force prohibi-
tion in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, “even if it is not intended to deprive 
that State of part of its territory and if the invading troops are meant to 
withdraw immediately after completing a temporary and limited operation . 
. . .”5  The authors therefore accept as a starting point that when U.S. forc-
es crossed the Libyan border and captured Al-Libi, the operation amounted 
to a use of force against Libya.  Three circumstances, however, may pre-
clude the wrongfulness of a sovereignty violation where it also amounts to 
a use of force: Security Council authorization; consent from the territorial 
State; and, self-defense.6  The latter two are relevant to the facts surround-
ing Al-Libi’s capture, and will be considered in turn.  
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ration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation 
among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, Preamble, G.A. Res. 
2625 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. DOC. A/RES/8082 (Oct. 24, 
1970) (asserting that “[t]he principle of sovereign equality of States,” and in particular that 
“[t]he territorial integrity and political independence of the State are inviolable.”). 
5. Albrect Randelzhofer & Georg Nolte, Article 2(4), in THE CHARTER OF THE UNIT-
ED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 200, 216 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 3d ed. 2012). 
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A. Libyan Consent  
 
It is not clear, as a matter of fact, whether Libya consented to the entry and 
presence of U.S. forces on its territory.  The Libyan Government has stated 
publicly that it did not consent to the U.S. operation, while U.S. officials 
have said that Libya knew of the operation in advance, and did not object 
to it.7 Assuming that the Libyan Government did consent to the presence 
of U.S. forces on its territory, there are two subsidiary issues: the scope and 
quality of Libya’s consent.8 
As to scope, the activities undertaken by the actor State’s forces must 
be within the limits of the consent granted by the territorial State.9  Libyan 
consent, tacit or otherwise, would need specifically to have authorized the 
capture operation.  Given the conflicting positions of the protagonist gov-
ernments, it is presently impossible to conclude whether the U.S. action 
was within the scope of any consent granted by Libya.     
With regard to the quality of consent, must the actor-State ensure that 
the individual giving consent carries his government’s authority? The In-
ternational Court of Justice (I.C.J.) has frequently held that the consent of a 
State official, even if ultra vires under that State’s constitutional arrange-
ments, is still sufficient to bind the State.10  The only exception to this rule 
is where the domestic incapacity of the State official is known to the other 
State, or is “manifest.”11  Accordingly, international law permits the U.S. to 
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rely upon the consent of a Libyan representative without having to make 
further inquiry into his competence.  
An additional question is whether consent to an activity is valid when 
the territorial State would be forbidden from undertaking that same activity 
because of its domestic law. It is a general principle of international law 
that a State may not invoke a provision of its domestic law to justify a 
breach of its international obligations.12  This means that if Libya granted 
the U.S. consent to enter its territory and capture Al-Libi, Libya may not 
now renege on its prior consent on the basis that its domestic law prohibit-
ed the undertaken activity. 
The conflicting positions of the two governments make it impossible 
to resolve whether Libya consented to the U.S. operation.  The Libyan 
Government’s denial of consent may have been intended to address do-
mestic concerns about the presence of U.S. forces in Libya.  It is clear, 
though, that if Libya provided consent, U.S. forces would be permitted to 
enter Libya in order to execute this operation.  If Libya did not consent to 
the U.S. operation, then the U.S. would have to rely on self-defense as a 




This article makes a distinction in its analysis between the crossing of the 
Libyan border and the capture of Al-Libi.  Self-defense raises a complexity, 
however, because it might be relied upon by the U.S. in two ways.  It could 
be used to justify only the crossing of Libya’s border, leaving the capture of 
Al-Libi to be based upon other grounds—the law of war, for example.  Or, 
since international law does not restrict the means by which a State may de-
fend itself, self-defense could also be a justification for the capture opera-
tion.13  This section therefore includes both aspects of the operation in its 
self-defense analysis.   
                                                                                                                      
12. VCLT, supra note 11, art. 27; MALCOM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 941 (6th 
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Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, states that “[n]othing in the 
present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective 
self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Na-
tions . . . .”14  There are three possibilities as to what armed attack the U.S. 
might be responding to, if Al-Libi’s capture is to be analyzed under a self-
defense paradigm.    The first is that the 1998 embassy bombings, in which 
Al-Libi allegedly played a leading role, may continue to provide a basis for 
U.S. action in self-defense.15  The second is that Al-Libi’s capture was con-
ducted in the face of a single “imminent” attack against the U.S., which Al-
Libi was planning.  The third is that Al-Libi, as a member of Al-Qaeda, was 
engaged in a campaign of attacks.16  
Under all three justifications, the perpetrator of the armed attack is a 
non-State actor. With regard to the second and third justifications, the U.S. 
would be in the position of acting in self-defense in anticipation of an ex-
pected armed attack, rather than in response to an ongoing or completed 
attack. This section will address these non-State actor and anticipation is-
sues, followed by the traditional immediacy, necessity and proportionality 
requirements of self-defense.   
There is dispute as to whether the law of self-defense extends to at-
tacks by non-State actors.17  The I.C.J. has been unwilling to consider 
claims of self-defense against non-State actors whose acts were not directly 
attributable to a State.18  However, the plain text of Article 51 does not lim-
it the right of self-defense to armed attacks by States.  Since the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001, States have recognized the right of self-
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defense in response to “armed attacks” not attributable to a State.19  For 
example, United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1368 (2001) and 
1373 (2001) clearly reference “self-defense” and “collective self-defense” 
measures in response to the 9/11 attacks at a time when the international 
community knew the attacks were perpetrated by a non-State actor.  The 
present authors join many others who regard this debate as largely settled 
in favor of this latter view.  The U.S. also takes this position.20 
The White House fact sheet on the conduct of extraterritorial opera-
tions against non-State actors balances the victim State’s right to defend 
itself and the territorial State’s right to sovereignty.21  Under the concept of 
sovereignty, a State has the right to protect its borders from incursions, but 
also has the duty to prevent its territory from being used by others as the 
launching point for an armed attack against another State.  This balanced 
approach requires the territorial State to be given a reasonable opportunity 
to suppress the threat originating from its territory before the victim State 
exercises self-defense, although the notice requirement is not necessary in 
every case.22  If the territorial State fails (or would fail) to act, because it is 
unwilling or unable to meet its external obligations, the victim State may 
lawfully exercise its right of self-defense, even without notice.23  There is 
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more than a century of State practice that supports this approach.24  If the 
U.S. concluded that an armed attack was being (or was about to be) perpe-
trated by Al-Libi from Libyan territory, then the U.S. would be obliged to 
notify Libya in order for Libya to halt the attack.  However, if the U.S. also 
concluded that Libya was unwilling or unable to prevent the attack from 
occurring, or that Al-Libi would be tipped off, then the U.S. could proceed 
to act in self-defense without notification. 
Most States and scholars accept the general concept of anticipatory 
self-defense, when an armed attack is imminent.25 However, there is no 
consensus as to when an armed attack can be said to be imminent.26  The 
Caroline doctrine permit[s] anticipatory self-defense when the “necessity of 
self-defense [is] instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no 
moment for deliberation.”27  While some view this standard as limiting self-
defense temporally to immediately before an armed attack,28 such an ap-
proach makes little sense in an era when catastrophic terrorist attacks can 
occur without warning.29  Accordingly, an alternative approach is the “last 
feasible window of opportunity” standard.30  Under this interpretation, a 
State, instead, may act in self-defense when the attacker is clearly commit-
ted to launching an attack, and the victim State would otherwise lose its 
opportunity to defend itself unless it acted immediately. 
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TERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST 412 (John Bassett Moore ed., 1906). 
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In the context of a campaign of attacks, anticipatory self-defense raises 
the following question.  Does a State have to make an independent immi-
nence determination for each potential future attack or is the fact of a 
campaign of attacks sufficient?  Arguably, if a group is clearly mounting a 
campaign of attacks, self-defense would be permitted and would not inde-
pendently need to meet the imminence criterion for each individual poten-
tial attack.31  This is certainly the view of the U.S.,32  and the authors are 
broadly supportive of this approach. 
In the Al-Libi case, the U.S. has not provided any information about 
whether it expected (or expects) any particular attack from Al Qaeda, or 
whether Al-Libi’s capture averted an attack.  Many news agencies report Al 
Qaeda’s involvement in the 2012 attack on the U.S. embassy in Benghazi.  
On the other hand, President Obama has repeatedly asserted that core Al 
Qaeda is “on the way to defeat” and that affiliates, such as Al Qaeda in the 
Arabian Peninsula, lack the capacity for a major strike.33  Somewhat contra-
ry to these statements, in order for the U.S. operation to be justified under 
“anticipatory” self-defense, the U.S. would have to believe that Al-Libi’s 
capture was conducted in anticipation of an imminent attack by him against 
the U.S., or that Al Qaeda is still perpetrating a campaign of attacks in 
which Al-Libi is involved. 
If, however, the U.S. exercised self-defense, not in anticipation of an 
imminent attack or in response to an ongoing attack(s), but instead in re-
sponse to an attack which has already occurred, then the U.S.’s use of force 
must be within a period of time not too remote from the initial armed at-
tack.  This immediacy requirement is based on a reasonableness standard in 
light of the circumstances at the time.  In this case, Al-Libi’s participation 
in the U.S. embassy attacks in east Africa occurred in 1998, 15 years prior 
to his capture.  In the authors’ view the use of force to effectuate his cap-
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ture in 2013, if exclusively based on his participation in the embassy bomb-
ings, fails the immediacy criterion of self-defense. 
The use of force in every instance of self-defense must be limited to 
what is necessary and proportionate.34  Necessity “requires that there be no 
alternative to the use of force effectively to defeat an attack that is either 
imminent or underway.”35 Accordingly, an assessment must be undertaken 
of the prospects of success for alternative courses of action which do not 
amount to a use of force.  Thus, the use of force to capture Al-Libi could 
satisfy the necessity principle if, for example, cooperative law enforcement 
measures to arrest and extradite Al-Libi were expected to fail. 
Proportionality addresses the quantity of force that a State can use in 
self-defense, restricting it to only that force required to eliminate the threat 
or end the attack.36  Since Al-Libi’s capture was a limited incursion into 
Libyan territory, a use of minimum, non-deadly force, the authors pro-
pound that Al-Libi’s capture was a proportionate means of eliminating the 
threat of an armed attack. 
In conclusion, the U.S. has not yet sought to use self-defense as a pub-
lic justification for the operation, and has instead relied upon the assertion 
of Libyan consent.  The consent justification, if factually accurate, is in 
compliance with international law. No information provided publicly thus 
far supports the exercise of self-defense. 
 
III. THE CAPTURE OF AL-LIBI 
 
Part II considered the U.S. operation from the perspective of Libyan sov-
ereignty.  This Part addresses what grounds in law the U.S. might have had 
for capturing Al-Libi, irrespective of the sovereignty (or border crossing) 
issue.  International law norms applicable to the capture and subsequent 
detention of an individual differ dependent upon whether the capturing 
State is a party to an armed conflict or not.  Because the U.S. has repeatedly 
asserted that it is engaged in a non-international armed conflict (NIAC) 
with Al Qaeda and affiliated groups, this paradigm will be considered first, 
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followed by an examination of whether there is any other lawful basis for 
Al-Libi’s capture in the absence of an armed conflict. 
 
A. Capture during a non-international armed conflict 
 
Al-Libi allegedly is or has been a leading and influential member of core Al 
Qaeda.  If true, the existence of a lawful basis for his capture turns on the 
following: (1) whether the U.S. is in a NIAC with al-Qaeda; (2) the geo-
graphical limits to the NIAC, if any; and, (3) the circumstances under 
which the law of armed conflict permits capture. 
The U.S. has justified Al-Libi’s capture under the laws of war.37 The vi-
ability of this justification depends in the first place upon the existence of a 
NIAC between the U.S. and Al Qaeda, which is determined though the 
broadly accepted test set out in Prosecutor v. Tadić: “[A] [non-international] 
armed conflict exists whenever there is . . . protracted armed violence be-
tween government authorities and organized armed groups, or between 
such groups within a State.”38 Since the U.S. Supreme Court’s Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld decision, the U.S. has stated that it is a party to a NIAC with Al 
Qaeda.39  However, the U.S. position is not universally accepted.  Under 
strict application of the Tadić test, some scholars have queried whether or 
not the U.S. remains in a de jure NIAC with Al Qaeda.40 Indeed, even 
among the present authors, opinion is divided on this question of fact.  
If one accepts that there is a NIAC, then the second issue is the geo-
graphic limitations, if any, of the NIAC. Common Article 3 to the 1949 
Geneva Conventions, which is applicable to conflicts “not of an interna-
tional character,” anticipated that such conflicts would occur within the 
confines of a single State.41  Notwithstanding this intention, today, the 
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39. Koh speech, supra note 20. 
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Hamdan decision interpretation is widely-accepted by other States and nu-
merous scholars, indicating that a NIAC need not be geographically limited 
to the territory of a single State.  This, then, raises the question of whether 
there are any geographical limitations when a NIAC is not restricted to the 
territory of a single State.42 
The U.S. subscribes to a view that a NIAC occurs where the parties are 
located, even if the parties are located in more than one State.43  According-
ly, the mere presence of the enemy in a State is sufficient to say that the 
NIAC is taking place there.44  Despite this broad interpretation of the geog-
raphy question, restrictions on action still exist. The presence of the enemy 
in another State does not provide sufficient grounds, alone, for the actor 
State to breach the territorial State’s sovereignty.  Instead, the actor State 
must still justify the violation of sovereignty on one of the grounds dis-
cussed in Part II.  While the authors agree that the clarity of the U.S. ap-
proach has much to commend it as lex ferenda, it does not appear to be re-
flected in other State responses to U.S. drone strikes against Al Qaeda 
members beyond the borders of Afghanistan, which is often characterized 
by vehement opposition to U.S. practice.45  
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example.  SIVAKUMARAN, supra note 43, at 251. 
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Pakistan and Yemen as a means of prosecuting the conflict with Al-Qaeda. See Paul Vale, 
Barack Obama Lambasted by Cabinet Minister Ed Davey Over Drone Strikes in Pakistan, THE 
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 2, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2013/11/14/ed-
davey-barack-obama-drones_n_4277940.html.  The new German Government has also 












The third question addresses the legal basis for detention in a NIAC. 
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has said that the 
power to capture and detain “flows from the practice of armed conflict and 
the logic of international humanitarian law that parties to a conflict may 
capture persons deemed to pose a serious security threat and that such per-
sons may be interned as long as they continue to pose a threat.”46  This 
ground for detention is forward looking, in that it seeks to prevent the de-
tainee from committing some future act harmful to the detaining State.  
While the U.S. has not provided a specific factual basis for Al-Libi’s deten-
tion beyond the criminal indictment, as long as he retains his status as a 
high ranking member of Al Qaeda, then arguably, he continues to pose a 
potentially serious threat to the security of the U.S. and is detainable on this 
basis.  However, this justification would likely have to reconcile other U.S. 
statements that suggest Al Qaeda, as a whole, is now a spent force on its 
way to defeat. 
Nothing prohibits the U.S. from transferring Al-Libi to the federal 
criminal justice system, presuming that he was lawfully captured under the 
law of war.  Indeed, international law plainly anticipates that members of 
organized armed groups in a NIAC may be subjected to the domestic crim-
inal jurisdiction of the State party to the conflict.47 
 
B. Alternative Bases for Capture 
 
While many still view the conflict with Al Qaeda as a NIAC, if the situation 
no longer crosses this threshold, then Al-Libi’s capture must be examined 
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Conflict, 91 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 859, 863 (2009). This ground 
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under general international law, and not the lex specialis of the law of armed 
conflict.  Without reliance on the law of armed conflict, Al-Libi’s capture 
and subsequent detention then would be governed by international law 
norms regulating the extraterritorial enforcement of a State’s domestic ju-
risdiction and human rights law.48 
As Part II showed, in the absence of consent of the territorial State, or 
any other lawful basis in self-defense, Al-Libi’s capture would amount to an 
unlawful infringement of Libyan sovereignty, and an improper extraterrito-
rial enforcement of U.S. domestic criminal jurisdiction.  Historically 
though, an unlawful capture has not provided the criminal defendant with a 
basis for challenging the State’s criminal jurisdiction over him.  The princi-
ple male captus bene detentus provides that “a person improperly seized may 
nevertheless properly be detained (and brought to trial).”49 
In U.S. v. Alvarez Machain,50 the Supreme Court of the United States 
held that the seizure of Alvarez-Machain by U.S. agents in Mexico was 
“shocking” and likely to be “in violation of general international law prin-
ciples,” but did not vitiate the jurisdiction of a U.S. federal court to try 
him.51  A similar position was reached by the English Divisional Court in R 
v. Plymouth Justices, ex parte Driver.52  In probably the most famous extraterri-
torial seizure case of all, the Supreme Court of Israel adopted the same ap-
proach in the Eichmann case.53  Contemporary commentators agreed that 
male captus bene detentus is a rule of international law, although many have 
been critical of it.54  It must be noted though, that male captus bene detentus 
pre-dates substantial developments in international human rights law. 
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), in Öcalan v. Turkey,55 
recently considered the issue of extraterritorial enforcement from a human 
rights perspective.  Öcalan was wanted in Turkey for offenses related to 
terrorism.  He managed to escape to Kenya, but was later detained by the 
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Kenyan authorities in order to return him to Turkey to face trial.  The EC-
tHR held that his transfer to Turkish jurisdiction was conducted with the 
consent and co-operation of the Kenyan government such that it did not 
breach Öcalan’s human right to freedom from arbitrary detention.  How-
ever, the ECtHR opined that without Kenyan consent, Turkey would not 
have had criminal jurisdiction over Öcalan,56 because an extraterritorial 
capture would not have been in accordance with a “procedure prescribed 
by law” within the meaning of Article 5(1) of the 1950 Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (or EHCR).57 
The Öcalan decision focused on the interpretation of Article 5 of the 
ECHR, and so it is plainly not binding on the U.S.  But Article 5 of the 
ECHR and Article 9 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Polit-
ical Rights (ICCPR)58 are united in forbidding arrest and detention which is 
not “in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law.”  The U.S. has rati-
fied the latter instrument.59  Although the U.S. does not accept the extrater-
ritorial application of the ICCPR, it does acknowledge that it is globally 
bound by customary human rights law.60  Of relevance to the Al-Libi case, 
the U.S. recognizes that customary human rights law contains a prohibition 
against arbitrary detention.61 It is not clear, however, that a U.S. tribunal 
would interpret the word “arbitrary” to include unlawful extraterritorial 
arrest as the ECtHR has done.   
While many jurisdictions continue to recognize the “male captus bene de-
tentus” doctrine, there are contradictory decisions from the same courts 
which have indicated that in some instances, jurisdiction ought to be de-
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clined.62  It is therefore possible that since the Alvarez-Machain decision cus-
tomary international law has been developing beyond the male captus bene 
detentus principle. Consequently, Al-Libi conceivably could contest U.S. 
criminal jurisdiction using this potential customary human rights norm as 
the basis for his challenge.63  If he did, the likelihood of success would be 
remote since a court would need to conclude that Al-Libi was not lawfully 
captured under the law of armed conflict, and that a customary norm has 
developed beyond Alvarez-Machain.  The court also would have to grapple 
with the U.S. Supreme Court’s precedence. 
 
IV. AL-LIBI’S SUBSEQUENT DETENTION 
 
This part begins by presuming there is a subsisting NIAC between the U.S. 
and Al Qaeda and will assess whether Al-Libi’s detention is lawful under 
the law of armed conflict.  In a NIAC, once an individual is captured, the 
law of armed conflict provides the detainee with certain protections. Pro-
tections relevant to Al-Libi’s case will be explored in the first section of this 
part, and will address whether the law of armed conflict permits the U.S to 
detain Al-Libi on board a warship.  The lex specialis of the law of armed 
conflict may be relied upon in a NIAC by the detaining State, instead of the 
narrower constrains on detention found in human rights law.64  This Part 
will also consider Al-Libi’s case exclusively under human rights norms, in 
the alternative to a NIAC. 
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A. Detention in a NIAC 
 
The rules governing detention in a NIAC are not as well developed as 
those in international armed conflict (IAC). Only some of the detention 
norms designed for IACs are applicable in NIACs.65  In particular, NIAC 
treaty law contains a limited set of norms on treatment and an absence of 
rules governing the procedural guarantees for security detention.  
It would not be appropriate to import the full panoply of the IAC rules 
for detention into a NIAC.  As noted by the International Criminal Tribu-
nal for the Former Yugoslavia in the Tadić case:  
 
[t]he emergence of the aforementioned general rules on internal armed 
conflicts does not imply that internal strife is regulated  by general inter-
national law in all its aspects. Two particular limitations may be noted: (i) 
only a number of rules and principles governing international armed con-
flicts have gradually been extended to apply to internal conflicts; and (ii) 
this extension has not taken place in the form of a full and mechanical 
transplant of those rules to internal conflicts; rather, the general essence 
of those rules, and not the detailed regulation they may contain, has be-
come applicable to internal conflicts.66 
 
Instead, Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions serves as 
a baseline standard for treatment upon capture in a NIAC.  
Common Article 3 prohibits the murder, mutilation, cruel treatment, 
torture, and outrages upon personal dignity of all persons taking no active 
part in hostilities.67  It also protects those detained from criminal sentenc-
ing without due process, affording “all the judicial guarantees which are 
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.”68  Additional Protocol II 
to the 1949 Geneva Conventions elaborates further upon the safeguards 
provided for in Common Article 3.69  U.S. policy regarding the treatment 
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of detainees in a NIAC accounts for basic humanitarian protections pro-
vided for in both Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II.70 
There has been no allegation that the conditions of Al-Libi’s detention 
have failed to comply with the standards set out above.  However, some 
have claimed that the mere detention on a warship, per se, is unlawful.  
Those who have made this allegation point to Geneva Convention III, (GC 
III), Article 22, which provides that “[p]risoners-of-war may be interned 
only in premises located on land and affording every guarantee of hygiene 
and healthfulness.”71  However, it is important to highlight that GC III, 
Article 22, is applicable only in IACs, and cannot automatically be import-
ed to a NIAC. Furthermore, even in an IAC, Article 22’s applicability only 
extends to those who have satisfied the criteria for prisoners of war status.  
Specifically, in order to achieve prisoner of war status, an individual must 
come within one of the categories contemplated in GC III, Article 4A.  Al-
Libi does not fall into any of these categories; nor is the conflict in question 
an IAC. Article 22 therefore does not apply to his detention. 
Others may argue that while Article 22 per se does not apply in a NIAC, 
“the general essence” of the article should be applicable during a NIAC on 
the basis of Tadić.72 This position is difficult to maintain, however. The 
most comprehensive legal instrument governing NIACs, which is Addi-
tional Protocol II, does not contain a rule equivalent to Article 22.73  More-
over, the rule is hardly all-encompassing during an IAC; for example, there 
                                                                                                                      
70. As a non-Party to Additional Protocol II, the United States is not bound by its 
provisions, but the U.S. Secretary of State has said specifically that the Protocol is reflec-
tive of U.S. practice and signaled its intent to seek Senate advice and consent for ratifica-
tion. Hillary Clinton, Secretary of State, Press Statement: Reaffirming America’s Commit-
ment to Humane Treatment of Detainees (Mar. 7, 2011), available at 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/03/157827.htm. See also Department of De-
fense Directive 2310.01E, The Department of Defense Detainee Program ¶ 4.1 (Sept. 5, 
2006) (providing that “[a] detainee shall be treated humanely and in accordance with U.S. 
law, the law of war and applicable U.S. policy.”). 
71. Emphasis added. See, e.g., Spencer Ackerman, Libyan al-Qaida Suspect’s Detention-at-
Sea Raises Geneva Convention Concerns, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 8, 2013), 
http://www.theguardian .com/world/2013/oct/08/us-detention-libya-al-liby-ship. 
72. Tadić Appeals Judgment, supra note 66, ¶ 126. 
73. AP II, supra note 47, art. 5.  Moreover, the AP II Commentary on Article 5 makes 
no mention that such a rule was even discussed in the drafting of AP II. COMMENTARY 
ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 













is no equivalent provision for those detained under Geneva Convention IV 
(GC IV). 
The absolutism of Article 22’s prohibition against at-sea detention for 
prisoners of war has been questioned, even in the context of GC III.74  For 
example, the ICRC calls for the “sensible interpretation” of Article 22.75  
This is because historically the article had two motivations.  First, during 
the Second World War prisoners of war had been held in ships in unsani-
tary and unsafe conditions, in particular by Japan.76  Second, belligerent 
ships (a fortiori warships) were at significant risk of enemy attack, potentially 
placing any prisoners in danger. These factors are now of less concern than 
they were at the time of Article 22’s drafting. 
In contrast to Second World War shipboard detention, modern ships 
(particularly an advanced amphibious command platform such as the USS 
San Antonio), which are equipped with more than adequate protections 
from the extremes of temperature and weather, are able to provide sanitary, 
hygienic conditions and sufficient food and water.  In addition, a U.S. war-
ship at sea provides safe conditions for detention without significant risk of 
enemy attack in the context of the NIAC between the U.S. and Al Qaeda.  
More recently, other States have detained prisoners of war aboard war-
ships in keeping with the ICRC’s invitation to read Article 22 sensibly.  In 
some circumstances, detention at sea might even be more humane than 
detention ashore.  During the 1982 Falklands Conflict, Argentina, after bi-
lateral discussions with the U.K., agreed that its prisoners of war could be 
held at sea aboard British warships.77  This decision was no doubt reached 
on the basis that a U.K. warship afforded better protection during the 
South Atlantic winter than make-shift accommodations ashore on the 
wind-swept Falkland Islands.   
The final objection to shipboard detention may include concern over a 
detainee’s access to impartial humanitarian bodies, such as the ICRC. 
Common Article 3 expressly provides that such groups may “offer their 
services.”  The U.S., as a matter of policy, notifies the ICRC of any deten-
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tions and grants access to detainees in all but exceptional situations.78  In-
deed, Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame, who was held aboard a warship by the 
U.S., was visited by the ICRC.79  Critics of Warsame’s detention have posit-
ed that shipboard detention risks the perception that the ship represents a 
“black site” in which unlawful interrogation techniques might be used.80  
However, that has not proven to be the case, either with Warsame or, as 
far as can be known, Al-Libi.  There have been no complaints that either of 
the shipboard detentions was inhumane, or conducted in violation of the 
Common Article 3 standards. 
It remains to be seen whether prolonged detention at sea may, as a 
matter of fact, become inhumane and therefore unlawful.  Factors which 
could jeopardize the legitimacy of detention at sea might include duration 
and the adequacy of medical care (whether generally or in relation to a de-
tainee’s specific condition).  In addition, extreme weather or sea state for 
an extended period might also risk rendering conditions inhumane.  These 
matters must be determined by the facts as they exist. Furthermore, there is 
no indication that detention at sea would present procedural ambiguities 
(such as length of detention, periodic reviews) beyond those that already 
pertain to detention on land. There is no per se prohibition against deten-
tion on a warship in a NIAC. 
  
B. Detention under Human Rights Law 
 
If Al-Libi’s detention was not based on the lex specialis of the law of armed 
conflict, it must be examined under the general principles of international 
law, i.e., human rights law.  While human rights law does not prohibit de-
tention at sea as a matter of course,81 there are several other factors that 
must be considered. 
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The ECHR and ICCPR both state that persons arrested or detained 
must be brought “promptly” before a judge.82  This is a requirement that is 
broadly reflected in human rights instruments and State practice, which 
could mean it is now reflective of customary human rights law, and there-
fore, may apply to Al-Libi’s detention.  In Öcalan, the ECtHR held that 
Turkey breached this rule, as reflected in ECHR, Article 5(3), when Öcalan 
was not brought before a judge until seven days after his detention.83  In 
Brogan v. UK, a case concerning individuals suspected of terrorism, the 
court found that a period of four days and six hours without review by a 
judge amounted to a breach of Article 5(3).84  However, in Medvedyev v. 
France, the court found that 13 days’ detention at sea, without judicial over-
sight, did not breach Article 5(3) because it was not “materially possible” to 
bring the detainees before a judge any sooner.85 In this case the circum-
stances were of pirates captured at sea whose transfer to the territory of the 
detaining State, France, took 13 days. On arrival, the detainees were put 
before a judge within a few hours, so that as soon as it was “materially pos-
sible” the detaining State had complied with Article 5(3). The flexibility in 
Medvedev is also reflected in several similar U.S. domestic cases.86 
Human rights law, therefore, does not provide a strict time limit. In-
stead, circumstances, such as the location of detention and the possibility 
of judicial oversight, are taken into account in determining when an indi-
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vidual must be brought before a judge.  None of these cases suggest a spe-
cial exception for situations of terrorism.87  If the U.S. can show that Al-
Libi was put before a judge in New York as soon as it was “materially pos-




The extraterritorial capture of Abu Anas Al-Libi raises questions in in-
ternational law ranging from the circumstances in which it is legitimate for 
a State to infringe another State’s sovereignty to the specific conditions of 
detention under both the law of armed conflict and general international 
law.  This article has not been able to draw conclusions on every issue 
raised due to gaps in the known factual narrative.  However, the foregoing 
analysis does allow for the statement of certain principles which may in-
form the conduct of future similar operations. 
 
(1) Consent of the territorial State will always be the most straight-
forward legal basis for what would otherwise be an unlawful in-
fringement of the territorial State’s sovereignty.  Obtaining consent 
will not always be possible, however, and so alternative legal bases 
may need to be considered.   
 
(2) Where the sovereignty infringement rises to the level of a “use 
of force,” as it did in the Al-Libi case, the only other legal basis for 
crossing the border will be self-defense.  As this article has shown, 
self-defense might be used as a circumstance precluding the wrong-
fulness of the whole capture operation.  However it might also be 
limited to justifying the infringement of sovereignty, with an alter-
native legal basis (such as in the law of armed conflict) justifying 
the capture.  In either case, the actor State will need to show that 
action in self-defense is in response to an “armed attack,” imminent 
or actual.  In an operation such as this, conducted against a non-
State actor, the actor State needs to be satisfied that the territorial 
State is either unwilling or unable to prevent the armed attack 
about to be perpetrated from its soil before it may act in self-
defense. 
 
                                                                                                                      












(3) The capture part of the operation may be grounded in the law 
armed conflict applicable in a NIAC where the individual(s) to be 
captured represent a threat to the security of the actor State.  Be-
fore a capture is affected under the law of NIAC, the actor State 
needs to be satisfied that the individual(s) to be captured is within 
the geographic bounds of that NIAC.  If the view that the law fol-
lows the parties is representative of international law, then the mere 
presence of the enemy in the territorial State is sufficient to con-
clude the NIAC is taking place in that State.  Following a capture 
grounded in the law of armed conflict applicable in a NIAC, a cap-
turing State is entitled to transfer the captured individual into its 
domestic criminal jurisdiction. 
 
(4) If there is no NIAC ground for capture, then the capture oper-
ation must be compliant with general international law norms gov-
erning extraterritorial enforcement of domestic criminal law.  His-
torically, where such norms were breached during capture, this did 
not prevent the capturing State from subjecting the individual in 
custody to criminal trial.  Whether customary human rights law has 
developed to eclipse or alter this rule is unclear, but in the U.S. the 
principle male captus bene detentus remains, for now, enshrined in the 
Supreme Court Alvarez-Machain decision. 
 
(5) Whether the capture is affected under NIAC law or general in-
ternational law, there is no norm which prevents per se the detention 
of captured persons at sea, in a warship.  NIAC law does require 
detainees be treated humanely and that international organizations 
such as the ICRC be granted access in all but extraordinary circum-
stances.  Detention at sea is perfectly able to meet these require-
ments.  Where the capture is governed by general international law, 
customary human rights law may provide that captured individuals 
are required to be put “promptly” before a judge as soon as it is 
“materially possible.” 
 
